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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/03/2004 Accident number: 394 
Accident time: 15:55 Accident Date: 13/05/2002 
Where it occurred: MF: 501, Arid al 
Mazra'ah, Nr Bra'Shit 
Country: Lebanon 
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?) Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: 23/05/2002 
ID original source: BoI: 002/2002 MJF Name of source: MACC SL 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: Fuze Ground condition: not applicable 
Date record created: 27/02/2004 Date  last modified: 27/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: GR: 36 7265 6730 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
 
Accident report 
What follows is the original Board of Inquiry report, edited for anonymity and with some 
extraneous pictures removed. 
 
REPORT FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD OF INQUIRY – No002/2002 
MINE Accident that occurred in OES 3 on 13th May 2002 in which [Demining group] Deminer 
[the Victim] was injured. 
Map Reference: UNIFIL Genimap 1:50,000 Sheet A (Tibnin). 




1. In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), the MACC 
SL Programme Manager issued a Convening Order on Monday 13th May 2002, for an 
accident investigation Board of Inquiry. Annex A details the Convening Order. 
2. This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry into the Mine Accident that occurred 
on the 13th May 2002. Based on the investigation, [Demining group]’s internal report, the 
statements from [Demining group] personnel involved in the accident (see Annex B), visits to 
the accident site and the photos from the accident site, this accident is considered 
preventable. 
3. The information provided by [Demining group] to the MACC SL QA Section in the “IMSMA 
Accident Report”, attached as Annex C is confirmed. The accident occurred at approximately 
1555hrs on 13th May 2002, in Minefield (M/F) No 501 at the Arid al Mazra’ah minefield, 
Bra’shit. Arid al Mazra’ah minefield is located to the West of  Bra’shit at GR 36 7265 6730, 
(M/F No 501 Command Post). Annex D details a map of the general area. 
 
Events leading up to the Accident 
4. At the time of the accident, [Demining group] Survey Team had completed the survey 
operations for the day at M/F 501 clearance site. The Survey Team had been operational on 
M/F 501 since the 09th May 2002; the Survey Team were conducting a Level 2 Technical 
Survey by means of a series of penetration cuts into the suspect area, in an attempt to 
identify the mined area. Annex E details [Demining group] Survey Team Site Clearance Map. 
5. On completion of the day’s activities, Team Leader [name excised] had ordered his team to 
start preparing the site for departure. The following concurrent activities were taking place: 
• Mine Incineration of the 3 x previously located Israeli No4 Anti-Personal (AP) mines. 
• The loading of the team demining equipment onto the team vehicle. 
• Movement of the mine fuzes from the explosive storage area to the team vehicle.  
Note  
[Demining group]’s manual neutralisation technique for the Israeli No4 Anti-Personal (AP) 
mine fuze, at the time of the accident was to attach the collar and insert the pin in the 
fuze, only whilst the fuze was being removed from the mine. Once this had been 
completed, the collar and pin were then again removed. The fuze would then be wrapped 
in tissue paper. 
6. Team Leader handed over the mine fuzes to Deminer [B], and ordered him to take the 
mine fuzes from the explosive storage area to the team 2i/c Deminer [C], who was loading the 
stores onto the vehicle. Deminer [B] took the fuzes to the stores area where upon Deminer [C] 
ordered him to place them on the ground sheet, as he was busy with another task, this 
Deminer [B] did.  
7. Once prepared to load the fuzes, Deminer [C] ordered Deminer [D, the victim] to pass him 
the fuzes from the ground sheet, to the vehicle where he was going to put them in the team 
detonator box. Deminer [the victim] picked up all 3 x fuzes and laid them on the palm of his 
left hand, he then handed the first fuze to Deminer [C] who in turn placed the fuze into the 
detonator box. 
 
Events following the Accident 
8. At approximately 1555hrs, an uncontrolled detonation occurred in the Command Post. 
Following the uncontrolled detonation, the Survey Team Medic [name excised] immediately 
assisted [the victim] by applying a shell dressing to his wounded hand. Following full 
stabilisation, the casualty was then transported to Bint Jubayl Hospital for medical treatment. 
Annex F details a schematic diagram of the accident area / scene. 
VIEW OF M/F501 - GENERAL AREA 
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Work History of the Casualty 
9. [The victim] has been working for the [Demining group] since October 2001. He has 
completed the basic Deminers courses and most recently the pre and post, Lebanon 
deployment courses. The operation in Lebanon was his first operational deployment. He is 
however considered by [Demining group] to be a competent and trustworthy employee; 
disciplinary action had never had to be taken against him. 
 
Past History of the Area 
10. The Israeli Forces (IF) initially, and later, the South Lebanese Army (SLA) previously 
occupied areas in and around Bra’shit. The mine-contaminated areas consist of the following: 
• 6 x defensive minefields around the former IF / SLA positions situated at Bal’awin GR 
36 7279 6724. 
• 2 x protective minefields than run along the Arid al Mazra’ah valley, to the West of the 
Bayt Yahun / Bra’shit main road, one being designated  M/F 501 by MACC SL.  
• 3 x protective minefields to the South and South East of Bra’shit. 
11. IF Northern Command reported the minefield details on the 12th December 2001, the 
minefield details reported were: 
• No IF minefield designator Number 
• Reference Point GR 36 7279 6726 
• Quantity of 48 Israeli No4 AP mines. 
• Minefield map is available. 
12. A previous mine incident occurred in the Arid al Mazra’ah minefield 3 x months previously. 
A local farmer inadvertently drove his tractor over an Israeli No4 AP mine; no injuries were 
sustained to the farmer.  
 
Sequence, Documentation and Procedure of Tasking 
13. Task Dossier (TD) OES 3 #002 was issued to [Demining group] on the 24th April 2002; 
the TD contains details of 5 x minefields in and around the area.  The clearance operation in 
M/F 501 commenced on the 09th May 2002 and up to the time of the accident a total area of 
913 sq.m had been cleared resulting in the disposal of a total number of 3 x Israeli No4 AP 
mines.  
 
Geography and Weather 
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14. The task site is located in a natural valley, 3kms South West of the town of Shaqra.  
Access to the site is via a stone laid track from the main Bayt Yahun / Bra’shit road. The area 
is surrounded to the East, South and West with high ground, the highest feature being Hajar 
et Tawil at 768m. The river Burah runs from the South East to the North West through the 
valley. The mined area was previously arable agriculture land, used for tobacco and wheat 
cultivation; there are no forested areas within the immediate district.  The weather at the time 
of the accident was fine and sunny with a temperature of approximately 24 to 26 degrees 
Celsius. 
 
Site Layout and Marking 
15. The site layout marking of the Command Post prior to the accident was in accordance 
with National TSGs and Mine-tech SOPs; as was the post accident marking. 
 
Management Supervision and Discipline 
16. [Demining group] clearance operation is supervised by an International Operations 
Manager and an International Operation Field Manager was in overall charge of Bra’shit task 
site.  1 x International Team Leader, commanded the Survey Team. There are no reports of 
disciplinary action being taken against [Demining group] personnel on the Bra’shit task.  
 
Quality Assurance and Quality Control 
17. [Demining group] Internal Quality Assurance is achieved through a system of on-site 
checks by an International QA Team to ensure adherence to National TSGs and [Demining 
group] SOPs. External QA is carried out by the MACC SL QA Section. No external QA visit 
had taken place on the Survey Team Bra’shit task site, but a “Setting Up” evaluation had 
previously been conducted on the Survey Team previous task site at Bayt Yahun on the 08th 
May 2002, the evaluation result was good. 
 
Communications and Reporting 
18. Communications in-between the Bra’shit task site and [Demining group] base location is 
maintained via HF vehicle Codan radios and VHF hand-held Motorola radios. On site 
communications in-between teams is maintained via the VHF system.  
19. On the day of the accident, the site had proper and appropriate communications and 
managed to pass all relevant accident information back to [Demining group] base location, 
which in turn passed limited information to the MACC SL via the HF system. Annex G details 
[Demining group] Radio Log. 
 
Medical Details 
20. [The victim] suffered deep fragmentation lacerations to the insides and tip of his left hand 
middle, ring and index fingers, a minor closed fracture of his left hand middle two fingers and 
a deep laceration on the inside of his left hand thumb. There was also a small minor 
fragmentation laceration to [his] right hand palm. [Demining group] Survey Team Medic 
administered medical treatment and stabilisation on-site to [the victim] (wound dressings and 
intravenous “Ringer” solution); casualty evacuation by road to Bint Jubayl civilian hospital 
then took place.  
21. On arrival at Bint Jubayl hospital, [the victim] was transferred to the X-Ray Department 
where x-rays of both hands were taken. He was then given 200ml of painkiller (Trodon), an 
anti-tetanus injection and an antibiotic injection. The hospital medical report that was 
submitted to the BOI is detailed at Annex H to this report. [The Annex was not made 
available.] 
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22. On the evening of the 13th May 2002, [the victim] was moved to the All-Rassoul All-
Aazam hospital at Beirut for plastic surgery on the injuries to his hand. 
 
FRAGMENTATION RECOVERED FROM  LEFT HAND THUMB 
 
Personnel 
23. A list of all personnel and their duties is detailed at Annex B. Written statements from 
[Demining group] personnel involved in the accident and [Demining group] internal report form 
part of the Appendices to the Annex. 
 
Details of Fuze Involved 
24. The Israeli No4 AP mine fuze assembly incorporates a lead-shear arming delay, it is fitted 
through a hole in the end of the mine and screwed into the wall of the charge compartment 
and sealed with a rubber O-ring. The arming pin protrudes through the end of the mine 
opposite the hinge. The arming pin is attached to a pull ring, which is looped over the fuze 
body and retained by a plastic cap during transit for additional safety. The striker is retained 
and secured by a square shaped slotted plate on which the open end of the box rests. 
25. The fuze is designed purely for direct pressure operation. To arm the fuze, the plastic cap 
on the end of the fuze is removed to release the pull ring; the arming pin is then removed. The 
spring-loaded striker is retained until it has sheared through a lead wire, which runs through 
holes in the end of the fuze. The arming process normally takes several hours. Once armed, 
the striker is retained only by the slotted plate; pressure on the lid (in excess of 8kgs), simply 
pushes the slotted plate out which in turn releases the spring loaded central striker. The 
striker then impacts with the integral fuze detonator, which then passes the detonating wave 
to the main TNT charge causing the mine to disintegrate. (Paragraphs 24 – 25 inclusive 
extracted from Reference A). 
 
ISRAELI NO4 AP MINE FUZE – SIDE VIEW 
 
[The fuze shown was pictured in the original report and does not include the detonator – only 
the initiation cap. As a result it is not clear whether the complete detonator was present.] 
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Account of Activities 
26. The following is a description of the events before and after the accident. The information 
from the investigation forms the basis of the description of events: 
 
13/05/02 
• 1555hrs – Uncontrolled detonation at M/F 501. 
• 1615hrs – Casualty evacuation of casualty to Bint Jubayl hospital. 
• 1621hrs – Casualty arrives at the hospital. 
• 1755 hrs - Notification of accident to MACC SL. 
• 1800hrs – Casualty leaves hospital to move to Beirut hospital. 
• 1830hrs – BOI Convened. 
• 1900hrs - Notification of accident to NDO. 
• 2045hrs – Casualty arrives at Beirut hospital. 
• 2300hrs – Casualty moves into theatre for operation on left hand to remove metal 
fragments and receive plastic surgery. 
 
14/05/02 
• 0130hrs – Casualty leaves theatre. 
• 1000hrs – Casualty discharged from Beirut hospital. 
• 1300hrs - BOI Arrives at [Demining group] base location. 
• 1335hrs – BOI Leaves [demining group] base location to move to accident site. 
• 1350hrs – BOI Arrives at accident site to conduct accident investigation. 
• 1515hrs – BOI Leaves accident site to move to [Demining group] base location. 
• 1530hrs – BOI Arrives at [Demining group] base location to conduct witness 
interviews and collate the task information. 
• 1700hrs – BOI Leaves [Demining group] base location to move to MACC SL. 
• 1800hrs – BOI Arrives at MACC SL. 
 
15/05/02 
• 0715hrs – BOI Leaves MACC SL to move to [Demining group] base location. 
• 0815hrs – BOI Arrives at [Demining group] base location to conduct interviews with 
[the victim] and the Medical Supervisor.  
• 1000hrs – BOI Leaves [Demining group] base location to move to MACC SL. 
• 1100hrs – BOI Arrives at MACC SL. 
 
Insurance Details 
27. [The victim] is covered by the standard [Demining group] insurance for all International 
personnel in mine/UXO clearance activities in Lebanon. All insurance policies for [Demining 





28. Based on the investigation, the statements and visits to the site, the Board of Inquiry 
conclude the 
following: 
• There was an uncontrolled detonation of an Israeli No4 Anti Personnel mine fuze.  
• At the time of the uncontrolled detonation, no cylindrical collar was attached or safety 
pin inserted into the Israeli No4 Anti-Personal (AP) mine fuze, the fuze was however 
had been wrapped in tissue paper 
• [The victim] injuries were sustained from the primary fragmentation, resulting in the 
part disintegration of the Israeli No4 mine fuze, on the detonation of the primary  high 
explosives fill.  
• There is no evidence to ascertain that prior to the accident, [Demining group] on-site 
manual neutralisation techniques for the Israeli No4 AP mine were being infringed.  
• The detonator box as used by [Demining group] teams is inappropriate and requires 
replacing. 
• An inexperienced Deminer was allowed to handle fuzes / detonators. 
• The medical treatment and subsequent evacuation of the casualty by the on-site 
medic was very good 
• The post-accident marking of the accident site was carried out in accordance with 
current SOPs. 
• The passage of information in between the accident site and [Demining group] base 
location was good, with all relevant information being passed in a timely manner. 
• The passage of the accident information to the MACC SL via HF means was 
incomplete and not as per Annex A to [Demining group] SOP No 26. 
• The passage of the accident information to the MACC SL was not within the 30 
minute notification  time, as detailed in TSGs Chapter 16, Para 16.1. 
• The accident information passed to the MACC SL via the HF means was not 
recorded in the [Demining group] radio operator’s log. 
• The BOI agrees with and accepts [Demining group] Accident Report and IMSMA 
Report. It should be noted however that there are inaccuracies with regards to the 
BOI schematic diagram of the area as detailed at Annex F to this report, and the site 
layout diagram as presented in [Demining group]’s Accident Report, Annex B 
Appendix 1. The information for the BOI schematic diagram, was obtained from the 
Survey Team Leader at the actual accident site. 
29. The BOI concludes that the most likely explanation why there was an uncontrolled 
detonation, is that the slotted striker retaining plate was either moved or disturbed by [the 
victim]. This would have allowed the spring-loaded striker to move forward and impinge on the 
detonator.   
30. The BOI has not been able to conclude in any certainty, whether this action was a 
deliberate foolhardy action, or a genuine innocent mistake.  
 
Recommendations 
31. The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions: 
• An amendment be made to the National TSGs for Mine/UXO Clearance, Chapter 4, 
Page 4-3, Para 4.13 (Action on Locating a Mine). 
• Cylindrical collars must remain attached, and safety pins must remain inserted into 
the Israeli No4 Anti-Personal (AP) mine fuze, from the time that they are neutralised 
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in the minefield up to and including the time that they are destroyed by demolition. 
This is to be amended in [Demining group] SOPs. 
• A more appropriate packing material (foam), is used to secure loose fuzes and 
detonators, rather than paper tissues. 
• Fuzes and detonators should always be stored and transported in closed metal 
containers, from the time that they are recovered on-site until immediately prior to 
destruction by demolition. [The box used was shown in a photograph and was a 
plastic “lunch-box”.] 
• Suitably approved metal detonator boxes are to be used by all [Demining group] 
Clearance Teams. (MACC SL to issue as soon as practically possible). 
• Detonators and explosives are only to be handled by experienced and trained 
personnel (Team Leaders).  
• The passage of the accident information to the MACC SL must be complete and as 
per Annex A to [Demining group] SOP No 26. 
• MACC SL must be informed of all Accidents / Incidents as soon as practically 
possible (30 minutes), as per TSGs Chapter 16, Para 16.1. 
• All radio messages should be logged in the radio log. 
• Only accurate information is presented to any BOI investigation. 
• The conclusions detailed in this report be distributed and discussed among all 
[Demining group] Operational Field Staff. 
32. It is acknowledged by the BOI, that the second recommendation has already been 
actioned by [Demining group]. 
Signed: QA Officer, Mine Action Co-ordination Centre South Lebanon 
 
Annexes: (not made available) 
A. MACC SL convening order for accident investigation Board of Inquiry. 
B. List of personnel involved with attached statements as Appendices. 
C. IMSMA Mine/UCO accident report. 
D. Map of the general area. 
E. [Demining group] Survey Team site map.  
F. Schematic diagram of the accident area/scene. 
G. [Demining group] Radio Log. 
H. Bint Jubail Hospital Report 
 
Comments by the MACC SL Operations Officer 
I concur with the recommendations of this report. 
My main concerns are: 
1. The initial accident report was slow and incomplete, this information should go directly to  
MACC SL Operations via the communications room within 30 minutes and not 
directly to the QA Officer. 
2. The No4 AP mine fuze once neutralised and removed from the mine was handled and 
moved without the cylindrical collar and safety pin in place. These 2 x safety features 
must remain in place until destruction by detonation. 
3. This accident was preventable and the BOI recommendations shall be implemented when 
dealing with this fuze, if manual neutralisation is to continue. 




Comments by the MACC SL Programme Manager 
I have reviewed the Report of the Board of Inquiry and I concur with the Board’s findings and 
recommendations. I recommend that the relevant National TSGs be amended accordingly. 
I support the Operations Officer’s comments. 
The final Report of the Board was delayed as a result of a third accident occurring. The third 
accident is currently under investigation. 
 
Signed: Programme Manager, Mine Action Co-ordination Centre South Lebanon 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 509 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 26 minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: frontal apron, long 
visor 
 




See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
No formal accident report was made available. In the Board of Inquiry report it was stated 
that: 
The victim “suffered deep fragmentation lacerations to the insides and tip of his left hand 
middle, ring and index fingers, a minor closed fracture of his left hand middle two fingers and 
a deep laceration on the inside of his left hand thumb. There was also a small minor 
fragmentation laceration to [his] right hand palm”.  
The Victim was moved to the All-Rassoul All-Aazam hospital at Beirut for plastic surgery on 
the injuries to his hands. 




The primary cause of this accident is listed as “inadequate training” because the victim and 
his supervisors were handing fuzes that had not been rendered safe, although it appears that 
were working in ways approved by their managers and allowed within their SOPs. The 
investigators described him as “inexperienced”, which implies a lack of suitable preparation 
for the work. The secondary cause is listed as “inadequate equipment” because the group 
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were not using approved means of packing or transporting fuzes. It is likely that they did not 
have a suitable supply of fuze collars and pins with which to render them safe to transport. 
The investigators declare uncertainty (paragraph 30) over whether “the incident was a 
deliberate foolhardy action or a genuine innocent mistake”. No evidence to support the former 
possibility is included in the report, but clearly the investigators did harbour the suspicion that 
there was some “horseplay” involved. 
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